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Epicurus on pleasure and happiness 
(First draft)
Julia Annas (University of Arizona)
Epicurus was, notoriously, a hedonist. Also, like all other 
ancient ethical theorists, he took ethics to be about the agent's 
final good, and held this to be eudaimonia or happiness. What 
makes his ethics hard to interpret is the fact that our texts do 
not make it obvious how Epicurus saw the formal structure of his 
ethics. (1)
A famous passage in the Letter to Menoeceus (129-130) suggests 
that in seeing pleasure as the agent's final good, Epicurus was 
setting it up as something the agent should try to maximize in a 
straightforward way. While all pleasure is good, he says, it is 
not all to be chosen (and correspondingly for rejecting pain). We 
pass over pleasures if they bring an increase in further pains, 
and prefer present pains to present pleasures if this brings an 
increase in future pleasures. The impression of a proto-Benthamic 
calculus is strengthened by two points. Firstly, we judge these 
matters by measuring. Secondly, 'we treat the good at some times 
as evil, and the evil on the other hand as good*. It seems as 
though, in deciding on each action, we reduce all the relevant 
factors to pleasure and pain, and measure these so as to maximize 
overall pleasure. No kind of pleasure is as such always worthy of 
choice; it can always become 'treated as evil' if it has bad 
enough consequences. Pleasures seem to be judged, then, by their 
Benthamic purity and fecundity.
This is at any\rate a comprehensible hedonism. But if we 
take it to be Epicurus', we find ourselves with an ethical theory 
that at once turns schizophrenic. For Epicurus insists on other 
theses. We should fulfil only desires whose neglect causes pain, 
or which harmlessly vary, without increasing, pleasure. (2) We 
seek ataraxia or tranquillity, which sets bounds to our pleasure­
seeking and sends us towards sober reasoning rather than fish and 
sex. (3) We should value the great good of self-sufficiency, and 
be thankful that our nature has made it easy to satisfy those 
desires the satisfaction of which leads to tranquillity. We 
should be happy with bread and water, appreciating cheese if it 
is present but not distressed by its absence. (4)
This cautious and austere side to Epicureanism is likewise 
comprehensible, if we see it as an attempt to achieve 
tranquillity as our main aim. But it is nobody's idea of how to 
maximize pleasure. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
Epicurean ethics have often been thought to involve a central 
failure of nerve: we start pursuing pleasure but then get
dramatically inhibited in this search by feelings of insecurity 
which direct us to tranquillity instead. The ethics seems to lack 
a unifying structure.
Given the state of our sources, the search for such a 
structure is bound to involve much interpretation of a 
speculative kind. This paper is the start of an attempt to 
understand Epicurean ethics as a coherent version of 
eudaimonistic ethics, and to fit the texts in the right way into 
the speculation. Needless to say, it is provisional and capable 
of much improvement. (5)
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importance of locating the virtues correctly in the happy life. 
In these respects Mill is far closer to the ancients than he is 
to the modern consequentialist tradition of utilitarianism which 
arguably begins with Sidgwick; and I shall use parallels from 
Mill, not indeed to prove claims about Epicurus, which they could 
hardly do, but to show that a theory of the kind I ascribe to 
Epicurus is not only a coherent possibility but has actually been 
held.
Epicurus regards it as obvious that pleasure is for all living 
things an aim, indeed the primary aim; newborn children and 
animals seek it, and hence its pursuit depends purely on feeling 
and not on any false beliefs. (12) It is the primary thing which 
is oikeion or appropriate to us; pursuing it comes naturally. 
(13) But this of course does not show that pleasure is complete; 
even if pleasure is what is primarily appropriate to us we might 
still pursue it as part of a wider good. Epicurus does two things 
which can comprehensibly be seen as showing how pleasure can play 
the role of an end to which all our other ends are directed. He 
distinguishes two kinds of pleasure, of which only one forms our 
final end; and he argues that everything other than pleasure 
which is sought for its own sake is really sought as a means to 
or part of this kind of pleasure.
Kinds of pleasure
It was noted as a prominent fact about Epicureanism that it 
recognized two kinds of pleasure, kinetic and static. (14) 
Unfortunately we have no sustained discussion, but the examples 
in I)e Finibus II 9 are reasonably clear. The pleasure of 
drinking is kinetic, that of having drunk static. Kinetic 
pleasure is the pleasure you feel as lack or need is being 
removed. Static pleasure is what you get when pain has been 
removed, but it is not simply to be identified with absence of 
pain, since it can be varied, though not increased.(Presumably 
it varies according to the activity pursued when one is in the 
natural state; but I shall not pursue that point here.)
Static pleasure is a difficult concept, but two things about 
it which are not (so) controversial are important here. One is 
that ataraxia and aponía are static pleasures (D.L. X 136). The 
end of the blessed life, we are told in Letter to Menoeceus 128, 
is bodily health and ataraxia. Notoriously, Epicurus says a few 
lines later that the beginning and end of the blessed life is 
pleasure, so unless we have a sudden switch of final ends, 
ataraxia is not an alternative end but a specification of the 
kind of pleasure that can be our final end; and this is what we 
find in 131, where Epicurus says that when we call pleasure the 
end, we mean not profligate pleasures but absence of bodily pain 
and mental tarachai or troubles: that is, the kind of pleasure 
which is elsewhere said to be static rather than kinetic. 
Epicurus' procedure here makes it reasonable to take ataraxia as 
a notion that can help to explicate that of static pleasure. 
Ataraxia is the state in which you are not hindered by pain or 
anything upsetting. You are functioning normally and nothing 
unpleasant is interfering. This is not 'tranquillity'; normal 
activity can be energetic and varied. Ataraxia, then, will be 
pleasure which is 'static', not in being a state of arrested 
movement but in being the pleasure of a state of functioning in 
vwhich there is no interfererice.
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prejudice, preaching and lack of realism. Nevertheless, the 
strategy of appealing to human nature to ground one's concept of 
pleasure as our final end is in principle a good one. It compares 
favourably with Mill's appeal to the inclusion of 'higher' 
pleasures to make pleasure fit to be our ultimate aim. Mill in 
doing this both offends our intuitions and imports a blatantly 
non-hedonic standard to modify his account of pleasure to make it 
the ultimate end he needs. Epicurus is, by contrast, developing 
our intuition that there are two different kinds of thing that we 
call pleasure. The common ancient objection, so prominent in 
Cicero, that Epicurus is using 'pleasure' in two quite distinct 
senses, clearly arises from ignoring the fact that the two uses 
of 'pleasure' are not set up arbitrarily, but are both natural 
uses of 'pleasure', and are connected on the one hand to the 
removal of need or pain, and on the other to being unimpededly in 
the natural state.
Of course, this point about the static/kinetic pleasure 
distinction shows only how Epicurus can establish that there is 
a sense in which pleasure could plausibly be our final good. We 
need to show that it is^ : and Epicurus does argue that pleasure 
(static pleasure) is not just an end, but is complete.
Pleasure and virtue.
Intuitively we reject the claim that pleasure, even static 
pleasure as Epicurus has presented the notion, is complete; for 
there are many things at which we aim for their own sakes, 
without having pleasure as our further aim in seeking them. Like 
Mill in Utilitarianism ch. 4 Epicurus concentrates on the 
virtues as the crucial case of this. For we want to be brave, for 
example, and to act bravely, for its own sake; to see pleasure as 
a further aim in being brave undermines our way of thinking of 
bravery. Virtue is the hardest case, and also one that is 
centrally important to how we view our lives; a theory that our 
final good, happiness, is pleasure must account adequately for 
the way we think of virtue in our lives, or it cannot succeed.
The Epicurean response to this seems straightforward enough. 
'It is because of pleasure that we choose even the virtues, not 
for their own sake, just as we choose medicine for the sake of 
health' (D.L. X 138). The virtues, that is, have merely 
instrumental status. And there are notorious quotations from 
Epicurus which put the point in a very downright way. One should 
honour the noble and the virtues and that kind of stuff, if they 
produce pleasure; but if they don't produce it one should leave 
them alone'. (Usener (=U) 70) And, more revoltingly, Ί  spit on 
the noble and those who emptily admire it, when it doesn't make 
any pleasure’ (U 512). (Diogenes of Oenoanda continues in this 
vein when in fr. 26 Chilton he rails against the stupidity of 
those who would make virtue our final end, not something 
productive of it.)
But this is not the whole story. Elsewhere we find three 
interesting charcterizations of the relation to virtue and 
pleasure. Firstly, virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, 
while other things, for example food, are separable (D.L. X 138,
U 506). Torquatus claims inseparability for all the virtues at 
Fin. I 50. Separability is a protean notion; (at least) two ideas 
may be in play here. I may get pleasure from food or fail to do 
so, but I cannot fail to get pleasure from virtue. Or; food is
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medicine and health for exactly this purpose in Utilitarianism 
ch. 1, evidently thinking it consistent with what he says about 
virtue and pleasure in ch. 4.) Of course there are problems here 
for Epicurus, notably how he is to avoid (or render palatable) 
being committed to the thesis that the life of virtue is 
sufficient for the pleasant life; these problems are not 
insoluble, but there is no scope to enter in on them properly 
here.
If we construe what Epicurus says about pleasure and virtue 
overall, then, we get the following picture. Pleasure, but not 
virtue, is complete- pleasure, that is, construed as static 
pleasure, i.e. the pleasure of unimpeded natural functioning. We 
seek virtue, therefore, for the sake of pleasure. But we are not 
compelled to give a narrowly instrumentalist account of the value 
of virtue. Virtue can be sought and valued for its own sake; for 
living virtuously is required by, makes up, is part of, living 
pleasantly, and is not a replaceable means to it.
It is clear that to be at all plausible this relies heavily on 
the idea that pleasure as our final good is the condition of 
unimpeded natural activity, not pleasant feelings. It is also 
clear that very heavy reliance is being put on the notion of 
nature. For why ever should we think it true that living 
virtuously is inseparable from, entails and is entailed by, has 
grown to be a part of, living pleasantly, even when this is 
construed as living in a natural and unimpeded condition? Again, 
there are complexities here for Epicurus (especially given his 
very intellectualist and revisionary conception of the virtues).
Pleasure, then, is our final end, but this allows us to 
regard the virtues non-instrumentally. What happens, however, on 
a particular occasion when I can only exercise a virtue with 
clear loss of pleasure, and only get pleasure by acting against 
the virtue? If the value I place on justice, say, is non­
instrumental, I will act justly; the loss of pleasure cannot 
outweigh the demands of virtue. But then I do not look very like 
someone whose final good is pleasure. If I act to get pleasure, 
then pleasure is clearly my final good, but by allowing 
considerations of pleasure to outweigh those of justice I have 
undermined the thought that I regard the virtues non­
ins trumentally.
Thir problem is most familiar to us in its utilitarian 
version. Again Mill and Epicurus share the problem because they 
both want their theory to be revisionary to the extent of 
establishing pleasure as our complete and final end; but 
conservative in that it is not to revise our non-instruméntal 
attitude to the virtues. Mill's reaction is complex and wavering; 
Epicurus' brief but unambiguous.
As we have seen, Epicurus insists that pleasure is our 
complete and final end and also that we do not regard the virtues 
merely as means to it. The rhetoric of Torquatus' account, in 
Fin. I, of how we seek the virtues for the sake of pleasure is 
designed to combine these theses without indicating how conflict 
might arise. It is the Epicureans' opponents who force the 
issue. Prominent among Cicero’s objections in Fin. II are three 
which are relevant to this point. Firstly, Epicureans do not mean 
the same as ordinary people when they talk of the virtues. The 
account they give of virtuous action is false, since they falsify
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that ethical theory that ordinary people are confused on the 
basic matter of what our final good is?
We do not know if Epicurus would have welcomed any of these 
defences, and here speculation may seem to have outrun the texts. 
Still, the speculation is sparked by ancient objections to 
Epicureanism, objections made by people who could read the 
complete texts; it is hard to think that the apparent 
indeterminateness of Epicurus' position here is due solely to the 
state of our sources. That position here seems very like Mill's, 
and for good reason: they both want to be revisionary about the 
role of pleasure without undermining our thoughts about virtue. 
Neither seems to take the measure of the difficulties;it is 
arguable that both must, to be consistent, take in the end the 
hard-minded position they do not want and palliate it as best 
they can.
I have concentrated on Epicurus' attempt to show that pleasure 
is complete, not just one aim we have for its own sake but 
ultimately the only non-instrumental aim we have. I have tried to 
show that, although the theory is open to serious objections, it 
does not collapse from lack of internal structure. It is a 
serious attempt to show that pleasure can be our final end and 
therefore a candidate for giving us the content of happiness. 
Whatever its problems, the theory is a unified attempt to tell us 
what eudaimonia is, not a recommendation to maximize pleasure 
coupled with unmotivated constraints on how to do this.
Epicurus' hedonism, then, is not rightly seen as applying 
directly to actions, telling us that the right thing to do is to 
calculate what will maximize pleasure in each action we perform. 
Rather, Epicurus is telling us that we will be happy, have the 
best overall life, by having pleasure as our final aim, and that 
we shall achieve this by living according to the virtues, i.e. by 
becoming a certain sort of person. Epicurean hedonism, then, is 
not a theory that gives us any kind of decision-procedure to 
apply to our actions. Rather, like other ancient ethical 
theories, it gives us a policy to apply to our lives to transform 
the kind of people we are. This policy will of course have 
results for how we act. But it will do so not by giving us a 
decision-procedure for actions, but by changing our desires. 
Rather than apply a calculus, 'we should confront all desires 
with this question:What will happen to me if what is sought by 
this desire comes about, and what if it does not?' (SV 71)
In the jargon, Epicurean hedonism is agent- rather than act- 
centred. This is an unsurprising result; ancient ethical theories 
differ in the content they give to eudaimonia, but share a 
eudaimonistic framework; and the idea that an ethical theory 
should release us from the effort of thinking what we should do 
by giving us a decision-procedure for action is a recent idea. 
Still, there seems to be a difficulty here in the Letter to 
Menoeceus passage with which I began, the one which I there said 
did suggest (and has to many suggested) arather different 
interpretation. How does this fit into the structure of Epicurean 
ethics as I have sketched that?
The jargon of agent- and act-centred thebries may mislead us 
here. The ancients were clear that an ethical theory giving one a 




1. The Letter to Menoeceus is a short edifying exhortation; it 
does not reflect the scope of Epicurean ethics (containing 
nothing, for example, on friendship or the contractual theory of 
justice) and we have no reason to think that it reflects the 
structure of works like the Peri Telous, from which we have only 
short and tendentiously excerpted fragments.
2. Letter to Menoeceus 127, KD 3, 18, 29, 30, SV 21, Fin. 45-6.
3. Letter to Menoeceus 128, 131-2. Cf. KD 17, SV 79, Usener (=U) 
519.
4. Letter to Menoeceus 130-1, KD 15, 21, 26, SV 59, U 202. See U 
181 for the bread and water, and U 182 for the cheese.
5. This paper represents part of a projected work on ancient 
eudaimonistic ethics, covering Aristotle and later Peripatetic 
ethics, Epicurus and the Stoics and focussing on some basic 
issues that arise for a eudaimonistic ethics. Epicurus' ethics 
have rightly been seen in a eudaimonistic framework by M. 
Hossenfelder in 'Epicurus- hedonist maigre lui', pp. 245-263 of 
The Norms of Nature, edd. M. Schofield and G. Striker, Cambridge 
University Press 1986; also pp. 23-39 and 102-124 of Stoa, 
Epikureismus und Skepsis, Band III of Geschichte der Philosophie, 
Munich 1985, hrsg. von W. Roed. Cf. also D. Pesce, Saggio su 
Epicuro, Bari 1974, pp. 69-72. I have also been much helped by 
reading excellent forthcoming work by P. Mitsis on Epicurean 
ethics, and by work by A.A. Long, especially 'Pleasure and Social 
Utility- the virtues of being Epicurean', pp. 283-329 of Aspects 
de la Philosophie Hellénistique, Fondation Hardt, Entretiens sur 
l'antiquité classique XXXII (1986).
6. SVF III 272, 275 (definitions of autarkeia), I 187, III 49, 67, 
208, 685 (virtue as autarkes for happiness).
7. Self-sufficiency as a great good: Letter to Menoeceus 130-1, 
S.V. 44, 45, 68, 77, U 200, 202, 458, 466, 476. It may_ be 
presented as a condition on our final good in a very vague 
fashion at Letter to Menoeceus 122: ’ we should take care for the 
things that produce happiness, since when it is present we have 
everything, and when it is absent we do everything to have it. ’
8. Arius Didymus ap. Stobaeus, Eclogae II 77, 16-17.
9. This occurs as a premise in an argument to show that pleasure 
is the highest good, and is assumed to be uncontroversial. There 
are problems with the rest of the argument, but these do not 
affect the present point.
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concern the adequacy of Epicureanism to account for the way we 
think of virtue, these objections are different: we get a
collection of cases which ( like the 'desert-island' cases 
thought up against utilitarians) provide cases where the theory 
under consideration would differ from ordinary morality, not just 
give the same answer but a less adequate account of why it is the 
right answer.
20. Fin. II 74-7.
21. Bailey translates 'turn to', Hicks, 'swerve aside';Arighetti 
has 'ti volgerai ad altro', Bollack 'tu t'éloignes' (La pensée du 
plaisir, Paris 1975). LSJ suggests 'stop short' for this 
passage. In any case there is a clear contrast with 
straightforwardly applying the principles.
22. One might, however, wonder about Letter to Menoeceus 135, 
where Epicurus says that it is better to fail eulogistos than to 
succeed alogistôs, since in one's actions it is better to judge 
rightly and fail than to succeed by chance. (There is a lacuna, 
but the sense is clear.) Whatever its merits as an attitude to 
chance, it certainly suggests an (inadvertent?) adoption of a 
two-level view: it is better, for achieving the pleasant life, to 
dispose yourself to obtain pleasure only in a certain way (viz. 
with the virtue of intelligence) even though so disposing 
yourself will bring it about that you actually achieve less 
pleasure than if you had not so disposed yourself.
23. At Fin. IV 46-7 we get the Antiochan objection to the Stoics 
that their final good (allegedly) does not provide the springs of 
action. Cf. also Fin. V, 15-16: summum autem bonum si ignoretur,
vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est.... cum intellegitur,
quid sit bonorum extremorum et malorum, inventa vitae via est 
conformatioque omnium officiorum, cum exigitur, quo quidque 
referatur; ex quo, id quod omnes expetunt, beate vivendi ratio 
inveniri et comparari potest.
24. Aristocles (U 442) says that Epicureans measure pleasures 
only by quantity, not by quality (metreisthai gar auta toi posoi 
kai ou toi poioi.) But this is clearly hostile interpretation, 
separable from anything that might be quotation. Cf. Pesce, pp. 
74-5, and p. 77: 'L'ufficio della ragione pratica, lungi 
d a l l ' e s a u r i r s i  d u n q u e  n e l  c o s i d e t t o  
'utilitarismo'. ,.per[ viene]. .*ad una discriminazione non piîi 
meramente quantitative, semplice calcólo algebraico di un'unica 
quantité omogenea nei suoi valori positivi e negativi, ma 
propriamente qualitative e d'essenza. Quest'ufficio la ragione 
pratica assolve con le due dottrine della classifícazione dei 
desideri e della distinzione del piacere in cinemático e 
catastemático.' Cf. also Gosling and Taylor, pp. 359-360.
25. As it is in the (very dissimilar) section of the Protagoras. 
There Socrates argues from premises which are adopted ad hominem; 
neither the idea that all values can be reduced to pleasure and 
pain, nor the idea that they can be precisely measured, need be 
ascribed to Socrates (still less Plato). We should take seriously
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